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The British literary theorist Terry Eagle-
ton has significantly influenced contem-
porary debates on culture. This essay 
provides a reading of his book The Idea 
of Culture (2000), in which Eagleton 
discusses historical, philosophical and 
political contexts of notions of “culture” 
thereby unveiling the political interests 
inherent to such conceptual construc-
tions. The essay highlights Eagleton’s 
complex understanding of relations be-
tween nature and culture as well as his 
own materialist approach to culture.  
Keywords: Culture; History of Ideas; Ger-
man Idealism; Critical Theory; Ideology
Ideas, Ideology, and Interests: On Terry 
Eagleton’s Approach to Culture  
This essay examines some aspects of Terry 
Eagleton’s intellectual engagement with 
the term “culture.” In doing so, the chal­
lenge is that Eagleton is by no means 
interested in conceptualizing a particular 
notion of culture in a way we are used to 
defining concepts and elaborate theories. 
Instead, with The Idea of Culture (2000) he 
provides commentaries on various histor­
ical notions of culture as well as on culture 
theories developed by different authors. 
Eagleton’s aim is to unveil the political 
interests inherent to such conceptual con­
structions or mirrored by them, respec­
tively. Yet, the close relationship between 
notions of culture and ideological phe­
nomena is an issue that has been preoc­
cupying the Marxist thinker, Eagleton, for 
many years as is reflected in a great part 
of his oeuvre.1 
Reading The Idea of Culture presupposes 
profound knowledge of the theoreticians 
and debates on culture and society 
throughout the last three hundred years. 
For a better understanding, Eagleton 
repeatedly summarizes the ideas as out­
lined by the individual thinkers, which he 
seeks to critically discuss. This methodo­
logical approach makes his argument 
more transparent, while it simultaneously 
facilitates a critical reading of his own 
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thoughts. However, the purpose of the 
present article is neither to give a critical 
interpretation of Eagleton’s argument 
(such an effort would require the precise 
and lengthy reconstruction of the theories 
that Eagleton comments on), nor is it to 
outline a critique of his approach to cul­
ture. Indeed, I do support Eagleton’s 
approach—at least regarding two signifi­
cant points. The first one is related to his 
argument when addressing the cultural­
ization of nature through work. Here, Aris­
totle’s theory of causality helps to clarify 
what Eagleton means when stating that 
“the natural” holds the potential for “the 
cultural.” Secondly, I support Eagleton in 
his discussion of the notions of “culture” as 
elaborated in German Idealism. Yet, as we 
will see, Eagleton is in this regard a bit “too 
fast,” and therefore, I will take recourse to 
Hegel in order to make Eagleton’s argu­
ment more plausible.
Indeed, the many lines of Eagleton’s com­
ments on the particular theories of culture 
generate a net of thoughts that deepens 
our understanding of the term “culture” 
which, all too often, is used in a rather 
careless manner. In the following, I will 
restrict my reading of Eagleton to the first 
chapter of his book The Idea of Culture, 
entitled “Versions of Culture.” In this part, 
he presents the materialist core of his con­
ceptual approach to culture; the following 
chapters merely contain exercises.       
Nature and Culture, Work and Discipline
Ever since Greek antiquity and Aristotle’s 
causality theory, we tend to conceive of 
nature as the part of the world based on 
the principle of motion (or change), 
whereas culture is understood as every­
thing based on the principle of motion (or 
change) in the realm of human objects 
and purposes. A tree grows straight or 
crooked, either way, it will never become 
a table; to become a table, a human 
(agent) has to cut the tree and work upon 
the wood accordingly.2  In so far, nature 
and culture seem to be two clearly distin­
guishable things. Yet, the word “clear” 
invites further reflections.
Water is as much a natural material as are 
gold and wood, but it is not a material suit­
able for creating a ring or a table. Only 
some materials hold the proper character­
istics for certain (human) purposes. There­
fore, it could be said that nature holds the 
potential for culture; it seems as if nature 
seeks to go beyond itself, or, in Eagleton’s 
words: “Nature itself produces the means 
of its own transcendence” (Culture 3­4). 
Obviously, nature and culture refer to one 
another. Eagleton, at this point, reminds us 
of Jacques Derrida’s notion of “supple­
ment” (Culture 4).  However, the decon­
struction of the binary established 
between nature and culture does not nec­
essarily lead to the complete disappear­
ance of that opposition; cultural history is 
not natural history. Thus, it is more impor­
tant to stress that the deconstruction of 
the opposition between nature and cul­
ture indicates its constant recurrence.
In the first instance, the opposition 
between nature and culture recurs as we 
are the “cultivators” of the nature sur­
rounding us. Both the individual and col­
lective needs and drives “call” for satisfac­
tion and require purpose­oriented work 
upon nature. Yet, work involves time, 
attention and energy, all of them often 
directed at other purposes than the imme­
diate satisfaction of particular needs and 
drives. And this is so because work 
requires cooperation. In order to avoid 
any destabilization of cooperative struc­
tures, the needs and drives have to be 
postponed and repressed. Nevertheless, 
even here we recognize that our own 
nature seeks transcendence; we would 
not be able to discipline ourselves if our 
human nature would not be endowed 
with the respective potential and ability to 
do so. At first glance, it might sound con­
fusing when we hear Eagleton’s remarks 
that the word “culture” conceals a theo­
logy (Culture 6). What he means, to my 
understanding, is that human nature’s 
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aspiration and ambition toward transcen­
dence involves a kind of desire for salva­
tion.  What sounds, in turn, perfectly clear 
is Eagleton’s statement on notions of “cul­
ture” as always containing history and pol­
itics (ibid.). The establishment, stabilization 
and transformation of disciplinary regimes 
results from historical processes and 
shapes these processes at the same time, 
and are by that measure necessarily polit­
ical. Eventually, the process of human cul­
tivation is related to an “ethical pedagogy” 
(Culture 6­7). The purpose of such peda­
gogy is to avoid coercion. It aims, instead, 
for the activation of voluntariness.     
Culture and the State
Eagleton discusses a second recurrence 
of the binary opposition of nature and cul­
ture in terms of the state. In doing so, he 
makes reference, among others, to Schil­
ler. The German poet and philosopher 
contrasts the factual human being with 
the idea of human perfectibility, which is 
represented through the ideal state.  In 
Schiller’s view, every human being holds, 
simultaneously, the disposition to perfect­
ibility. The duty of the state is to merge all 
the diverse courses of human action in 
order to create a pure and perfect human 
being (Schiller 10­11). Schiller’s notion of 
Bildung refers to a dialectical relationship 
between an aesthetic education, in the 
sense of the individual internalization of 
moral and ethical values on the one hand, 
and the modalities of shaping society on 
the other. Indeed, it is an interesting ques­
tion in how far ideas of the ideal state, as 
constructed in the tradition of German 
Idealism, prove to be “proper”, and if not, 
in how far they correlate with Schiller’s 
notion of culture or Bildung (Culture 6­7). 
Alternatively, this issue could be dis­
cussed by the aid of Hegel.
Like other thinkers of German Idealism, 
Hegel assumed the following structural 
basic characteristic of modernity: As a 
result of the differentiation of state and 
society into two different and self­regula­
ting systems of action, notions of nature 
and of culture appear in new forms. 
Nature is located within the subject of the 
“civil society” (bürgerliche Gesellschaft) 
and in everyone’s individual norms, goals 
and purposes of action in order to satisfy 
egoistic needs. The bourgeois subject 
considers the enlightened self as the only 
valid category. At the beginning, it is the 
state which “cultivates” the subjects in so 
far as it performs control and regulates the 
spontaneity resulting from needs and 
interests and from the actions needed to 
satisfy them. In Hegel’s thinking, law and 
morality are means of cultivation. This 
does not mean that institutions for regula­
ting law and morality would have been 
absent before the emergence of capitalist 
modernity. They were not. However, for 
Hegel and the German Idealism, those 
forms of socialization, with their legal­ana­
logue ideas and institutions taken as “cul­
ture,” were to be considered “pre­forms” 
and “pre­modern” — an issue that was 
enthusiastically debated in philosophy of 
history at that time.
According to Hegel, the understanding of 
the state as an institution to control and 
regulate implies that people are capable 
of going beyond particular needs and 
interests. This disposition to transcen­
dence constitutes a prerequisite for 
re cognizing ourselves as real human 
beings and for acknowledging that the 
human community is organized and ruled 
by the state and is a necessary condition 
for real freedom. Only as citizens do we 
own the capability of reasonable judg­
ment in terms of needs and interests on 
the one hand, and law, morality, habit and 
custom, or: Sittlichkeit  (ethicality/ethical 
order/ethical life) on the other (Hegel 286­
91). The “normal” subject is requested to 
understand and likewise to accept that, for 
example, economic competition is much 
“better” with rather than without a legal 
framework, considering that unregulated 
competition tends to endanger lives. For 
the bourgeois subject, relations to others 
are predominantly perceived as a neces­
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sary precondition to satisfy one’s own 
needs (Hegel 349). However, in so far as 
such relations are considered to be neces­
sary, it seems again as if nature seeks to 
transcend itself.
What Hegel can tell us is a history of the 
cultivation of the bourgeois subject who 
strives towards an ethical order. Simulta­
neously, and by the aid of disciplinary 
power, ethicality organizes the cultivation 
of the bourgeois subject. To relate back to 
Eagleton, theology, pedagogy and poli­
tics are intertwined in this process. How­
ever, Eagleton’s choice to exemplify this 
relationship with Schiller might be 
grounded in the fact that wherever Hegel 
speaks of Sittlichkeit, Schiller uses the 
word Kultur (culture).
At the end of this argumentative line of 
notions of culture/ethicality in German 
Idealism, Eagleton puts a big question 
mark. To his understanding, the idealistic 
view might be plausible and justifiable, 
but, at the same time it is closely entan­
gled with ideology; the state is conceived 
of as a sphere in which conflicts have been 
settled without ever politicizing these con­
flicts. One of the most problematic points 
in this regard is the idea of relating matu­
rity and temperance to culture, and of ren­
dering cultivation a prerequisite to politi­
cal participation and decision­making. 
Subordinating politics to the bourgeois­
liberal notions of “culture” and “humanity” 
has the tendency to disparage certain 
forms of politics, in particular, those forms 
developed to challenge the paternalism 
resulting from this subordination. One 
may recall the European colonial rhetoric, 
which denied the oppressed people in 
the colonies the right to self­determina­
tion as long as these people were not “civ­
ilized” sufficiently. 
Likewise, women and (other) dispos­
sessed people were denied the right to 
vote for a long time, a policy which was 
justified by the argument that these 
“groups” lack proper cultural capabilities. 
Against this background, any rhetoric priv­
ileging culture to politics must be inter­
preted as a means of power and political 
interests, however, it is these political 
interests that produce “humanity” (Culture 
7).  Eagleton’s critical commentary on 
notions of “culture” and “humanity” echoes 
Marx’s critique of idealistic notions of the 
political state.  Yet, it is remarkable that in 
the tradition of German Idealism “culture 
is neither dissociated from society nor 
wholly at one with it,“ rather, culture is both 
“a critique of social life” and “complicit 
with it” (Culture 8). For Eagleton, culture 
functions like what today would be 
labeled, hegemony:
“[a mechanism] molding human sub­
jects to the needs of a new kind of pol­
ity, remodeling them from the ground 
up into docile, moderate, high­mind­
ed, peace­loving, uncontentious, disin­
terested agents of that political order.” 
(ibid.)
Culture operates as if it was a form of cri­
tique, “occupying an unregenerate society 
from within to break down its resistance to 
the motions of the spirit” (ibid.).  To sum 
up, in line with German Idealism, it is still 
possible to understand culture in a double 
sense: Namely, as both a critique as well 
as an integrative power.
To clarify the logical status of the argu­
ment outlined so far: Any epistemological 
reflection on conceptual tensions and 
developments tends to appear as rough 
and as oversimplifying complex historical 
transformations. Yet, the development 
from work to self­discipline, and the stabi­
lization of disciplinary regimes in the mod­
ern state represent a logical process. But 
what is Eagleton trying to tell us with this? 
German Idealism constructed a notion of 
culture that leaves room for both the cri­
tique of power relations and a simultane­
ous conciliation. However, the more dis­
sonances arose between the German 
Idealism’s conceptualization of state and 
society on the one hand, and the material 
reality of state and society on the other, 
the more obvious the idealistic side of 
“culture” became. As a result, the moments 
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of critique and integration began to sepa­
rate from each another.    
Cultivation through Civilization, and Cul-
ture as Critique of Modernity
In French and English Enlightenment the 
term “cultured” referred to a set of pleas­
ing manners and customs as well as moral­
ity. This relationship was conceptualized 
as “civilization,” a term borrowed from 
French language. Civilization was not con­
ceived of as a privilege of a particular 
nation, but rather as something all human 
beings are intrinsically capable of learn­
ing. At the same time, the notion of civiliza­
tion was connected to relations of 
improvement and moving forward to a 
bourgeois­enlightened world.
This understanding of “cultured”/civiliza­
tion holds a descriptive element. Manners 
and customs can be described without 
outlining normative explanations on how 
and why individuals and collectives are to 
follow them. Thus, it is, for example, not a 
crime but simply a source for disgust and 
anger if someone belches in public.  How­
ever, civilization also holds a normative 
and compulsory element. Rules to regu­
late human behavior make a sharp distinc­
tion between what is proper and what is 
not, and they are simply justified in so far 
as their absence would mean barbarism. 
In addition, proponents of the Enlighten­
ment made a close linkage between civi­
lized sociality and socialization. An indi­
vidual cannot civilize the self on his/her 
own terms but needs social interaction. 
Somehow, there is an imperceptible shift 
in the notion of culture from the “cultured” 
or “cultivated” individual to politics and 
society as agents of cultivation. Both the 
understanding of civilization as transcend­
ing one nation’s space and the normativity 
inherent to the notion of “civil” render the 
Enlightenment’s view an universalistic 
approach (Culture 9).   
However, modernity underwent changes, 
from the pre­ and early era of industrializa­
tion to colonialism and imperialism. In 
these transformative processes “civiliza­
tion” lost its innocent touch—because now 
it was the “civilized subject,” who con­
quered other territories and subjugated 
the people of the colonies under the rule 
of slavery, oppression and exploitation. In 
other words, the notion of civilization with 
its normative content lost the power to 
convince. In order to bolster those norma­
tive contents, there was another word 
needed. “Culture” seemed to be a suitable 
notion whenever it was necessary to 
denote a difference from civilization.  
Eagleton refers to two specific versions of 
a critique of civilization that made use of 
“culture” in the 19th century.  One of these 
versions is the romantic pre­Marxist cri­
tique of industrial capitalism, while the 
other version is cultural pessimism. As for 
the latter, its proponents, such as Oswald 
Spengler, interpreted civilization as 
increasingly morally and normatively 
questionable as these transformations 
resulted in the devaluation of traditions 
and in degradation and brutalization. 
“Culture” was conceptualized as an oppo­
sition to the materialism inherent to occi­
dental civilization and modernity. At the 
same time, cultural pessimism rendered 
culture to be the privilege of those who 
had not surrendered to the materialist 
Zeitgeist. The individuals were to be dis­
tinguished between those who “have cul­
ture” and those who “have not.” In this way, 
culture was perceived in terms of indi­
vidual ownership and became functional­
ized in sharp opposition to society and the 
negative course of social change. In this 
sense, however, culture was de­entangled 
from national society and politics. Para­
doxically, this notion of “culture” is situated 
very closely with the notions of “cultured” 
and “civilization” as circulated during the 
early Enlightenment.      
In the very moment when culture became 
a discursive weapon against modernity 
(be it embedded in normative­critical 
statements or be it as any kind of aristo­
cratic refuge from the world), an additional 
tension arose. Civilization as the process 
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of permanent modernization holds the 
promise of an universal answer; civilization 
can reach everywhere and can be every­
where. “Culture” in contrast, is opposed to 
civilization and entails the powerful mean­
ing of representing “the particular.” Conse­
quently, culture can be pluralized. Eagle­
ton considers Herder as having invented 
the plural of culture (Kulturen). This linguis­
tic creation resulted from some kind of 
“anti­colonialist penchant for suppressed 
‘exotic’ societies” (Culture 12). The para­
digm of equality between different nations 
and their specific cultures (whereby the 
value of a culture is simply to be a culture) 
appears to be a refusal of the universalist 
idea of the Enlightenment, which posi­
tioned one’s own culture as being superior 
to those of the oppressed peoples (Cul-
ture 12­13). From this perspective, Herder 
opened a door for the romantic idealiza­
tion of different cultures.  In being suspi­
cious of one’s own modern culture, with its 
misguiding universalistic claims and its 
destructive power, Romantic thought 
molded the desire for an organic and 
intact society through projections and spe­
cific imaginations of “the other.”  
However, we know that such acts of pro­
jection can be twofold: on the one hand, 
they are connected to sympathizing with 
the “noble savages,” whereas they serve, 
on the other hand, to justify political 
oppression, economic exploitation and 
cultural dispossession of the so­called 
“primitives;” sometimes, both discursive 
strategies are combined with each other. 
This twofold character of “culture,” again, 
results from the fact that the notion pro­
vides both a cipher for criticisms and for 
legitimatizing or even veiling interests. In 
this regard, one more time we encounter 
the unity of the descriptive and normative 
elements of culture. Without any doubt, 
we can describe a particular culture as a 
whole and closed system; in the 19th cen­
tury, cultures in plural were related 
(roughly) to (traditional) “ways of life.” 
However, notions of tradition, community, 
solidarity, etc. which are not eliminable 
from “way of life” descriptions, embrace 
normative content. We may approve such 
content, especially if there is no reason to 
consider tradition, community or solidarity 
as essentially “bad.” The apparent cultural 
relativism, which is often ascribed to post­
modern thinking, obviously results from 
the ambiguities of modernity and the plu­
ralization of the notion of culture.      
It could be assumed that the pluralization 
of culture serves the purpose of avoiding 
cultural discrimination. However, Eagleton 
seems to see the danger in pluralizing cul­
tures and warns of too much enthusiasm 
regarding difference. Tolerance comes at 
a price. Thus, it may be possible to find a 
culture that attracts us due to its fine social 
order, and there could be other cultures 
with social orders that do not harm our 
taste and political views, and so we deem 
them acceptable. But “generous plural­
ism,” Eagleton argues, becomes extremely 
difficult when extended to any “police can­
teen culture” or to the historically “rich 
diversity of cultures of torture” (Culture 15). 
In short, to Eagleton’s understanding, the 
pluralization of culture is nothing but for­
malism. At the same time, pluralization 
constitutes a contradiction of any positive 
and normative saturation of “culture.”     
Specialization: Culture and Art
Apart from both tendencies of culture, as 
a means of anti­capitalist critique and cul­
ture in plural, Eagleton discusses a third 
approach to culture, which is interesting in 
any endeavor to understand society: the 
tendency toward the specialization and 
narrowing of the notion of culture to mean 
art (Culture 15­16). In the era of Enlighten­
ment, men and women of the bourgeois 
middle class saw it as compulsory to 
engage in music, painting and literature; 
these things were considered “imagina­
tive pursuits” of the enlightened mind, 
and at the same time, a proof of belong­
ing to those “cultured” persons.  But, there 
was something more than these three 
fields. In the salon as more or less gen­
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dered space, the bourgeois public or “civil 
society” debated on what happened in 
the spheres of religion, science, philoso­
phy, economy and politics, as well as art. 
However, especially music, painting, litera­
ture and other art forms were rendered as 
criteria for defining whether someone 
“has culture” or not. From my perspective, 
Eagleton’s remark on the persistence of 
equating culture with arts is more than 
necessary. Just looking at terms such as 
“cultural politician” (Kulturpolitiker) or 
“minister for cultural affairs” we see that 
these agents are responsible for public 
funding and the regulation of art produc­
tion and circulation. They do not care for 
philosophers and economists, for weav­
ers, tailors and florists, nor do they pursue 
debates on the meaning of “culture.” What 
preoccupies Eagleton, are the following 
questions: If the meaning of culture, “lost,” 
for example, philosophy and science, 
what does this say about philosophy and 
science? And if “culture” is stripped of a 
wide range of fields, and is at the end only 
confined to a “tiny proportion of men and 
women” engaging in art activities and thus 
“producing culture”, what does this say 
about our society? (Culture 16)       
It seems as if Eagleton is walking the path 
of the dialectic of Enlightenment. We do 
have a capitalist economy with obvious 
destructive effects, and we own the natural 
sciences and technical disciplines that not 
only serve to improve the human condi­
tion, but are also responsible for the tre­
mendous ecological devastation, the 
invention of weapons of mass destruction 
and surveillance technologies. The value 
of the state of law and of democratic insti­
tutions cannot obstruct the view of the 
rule of bureaucracy and technocracy that 
has mantled politics. The professionaliza­
tion that science and philosophy under­
went within the process of academic divi­
sion of labor, as well as the increasing 
market­based utilization of knowledge 
production in these fields, lead to a “dry­
ing­out” of the channels that connected 
them to public interests.
Conclusion
The Enlightenment’s notion of culture, in 
the sense of cultivation through civilization 
in a movement towards progress, clashes 
with the realities of capitalist modernity 
based on economic exploitation, colonial­
ism and imperialism. Likewise, the alterna­
tive notions of “culture” fail: On the one 
hand, notions considering “culture” as a 
critique of modernity entail the risk of 
undermining the relationship between 
culture and society. On the other hand, the 
pluralization of “culture” tends to lose the 
normative momentum of the notion. This 
specialization eventually makes “culture” 
the privilege of “creative” minds. From this 
perspective, German Idealism has pro­
vided a way for reconciling these different 
notions, as it conceived of “culture” as 
both a critical and an integrative power. 
However, this option also fails because 
idealist imaginations of the political state 
stand in harsh contrast to the materializa­
tion of the state.   
What Eagleton teaches us is that we can­
not think of “culture” without considering 
and addressing its conceptual contradic­
tions. This conclusion is, however, not a 
justification of any kind of intellectual pov­
erty. Rather, it recognizes that the various 
and contesting notions of culture, as con­
structed in modernity, represent the 
mater ial contradictions inherent to capital­
ist society. Eagleton’s offer is a materialist 
idea of culture, which is based on con­
sciousness in terms of those aforemen­
tioned contradictions and the reasons 
supporting them. At the same time, a 
materialist cultural theory also tends to 
formulate, explicitly or implicitly, a social 
utopia in so far as the contradictions of 
“culture” give rise to hope—more precisely, 
the hope that contradictions can be trans­
lated into an impulse for the radical recon­
figuration of society (Culture 27­28).
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Notes 
1 The Ideology of the 
Aesthetic (1990), Ideology: An 
Introduction (1991), and The 
Illusions of Postmodernism 
(1996).
2 The difference between 
nature and culture can be 
exemplified by the aid of 
Aristotle’s theory of causality. 
Whereas, for example, 
the production of artifacts 
involves the efficient or 
moving cause (agent) and 
is clearly separated from 
the formal cause, in natural 
processes, both principles of 
causation coincide. 
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